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May Hospitals Withhold Ventilators from COVID-19 Patients with PreExisting Disabilities?
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Notes on the Law and Ethics of Disability-Based Medical Rationing
Samuel R. Bagenstos*

vie

For years, conflicts over medical rationing have preoccupied participants in
health-care debates. But they have tended to take place in the abstract—as in
discussions of what treatments will be covered under various health-care reform
proposals that may or may not pass. In many cases, discussions of these issues have
tended to the demagogic—as in the trumped-up furor over the supposed Obamacare
“death panels.”
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Due to the coronavirus pandemic, the threat of medical rationing has become
much more present. As the virus spreads throughout the United States, providers in
various areas have found themselves lacking adequate medical facilities and
equipment to handle the predicted number of cases. Hospitals faced with a crush of
patients must confront questions of how to allocate scarce resources—notably, lifesaving ventilators—at a time of severe shortage. It seems more possible than it has
before that we will be in the triage situation that the law, bioethics, and policy
literature typically merely hypothesizes.1 Medical providers will truly be in a position
to choose who shall live and who shall die.2

ot

After the H1N1 outbreak in 2009, the Institute of Medicine urged states, in
advance of the next pandemic, to adopt “crisis standards of care.”3 These standards
were intended to guide how medical professionals would allocate their resources in
times of “a substantial change in usual healthcare operations and the level of care it
is possible to deliver, which is made necessary by a pervasive (e.g., pandemic
Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Member, University of
Michigan Institute for Healthcare Policy and Innovation. I thank Harold Pollack for a conversation
that helped me significantly in framing this piece. Thanks as well to the staff of the Yale Law Journal
for their very helpful editorial suggestions. I am among the counsel for a coalition of disability rights
organizations, who have filed several recent complaints with the Office for Civil Rights of the United
States Department of Health and Human Services to challenge state plans for rationing medical
services in response to COVID-19. This Essay represents only my personal views, however.
1 For examples of earlier discussions in the literature, see James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical
Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1345 (1981); Maxwell J.
Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 239; Govind Persad,
Alan Wertheimer & Ezekiel Emanuel, Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions, 373
LANCET 423 (2009); and Douglas B. White et al., Who Should Receive Life Support During a Public
Health Emergency? Using Ethical Principles to Improve Allocation Decisions, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 132 (2009).
2 Another area in which these debates have not been merely abstract has involved practices governing
organ transplantation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, similar disability discrimination issues have begun to
percolate in that area in recent years. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ORGAN TRANSPLANT
DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST
PEOPLE
WITH
DISABILITIES
(Sept.
25,
2019),
https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Organ_Transplant_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/RE26-CVWC].
3 INST. OF MED., GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE FOR USE IN DISASTER
SITUATIONS: A LETTER REPORT 3 (2009).
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influenza) or catastrophic (e.g., earthquake, hurricane) disaster.”4 Many states took
up the call.

er

re

vie

Unfortunately, the crisis standards of care adopted by hospitals and state
agencies often employ explicit disability-based distinctions. Until the Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) at the United States Department of Health and Human Services
intervened in April 2020, Alabama maintained crisis standards of care that “allowed
for denying ventilator services to individuals based on the presence of intellectual
disabilities, including ‘profound mental retardation’ and ‘moderate to severe
dementia.’”5 Tennessee still lists “people with spinal muscular atrophy who need
assistance with activities of daily living” as among those who will not receive critical
care in a situation of scarcity.6 The University of Washington Medical Center’s
guidelines provide that the goal in a crisis situation should be “[o]verall survival,”
defined as “healthy, long-term survival, recognizing that this represents weighting
the survival of young otherwise healthy patients more heavily than that of older,
chronically debilitated patients.”7 Guidelines promulgated by Washington State
provide that, in deciding whether to administer life-saving treatment to an
individual, hospitals should look to the individual’s “baseline [i.e., pre-coronavirus]
functional status” and should accordingly “consider [pre-existing] loss of reserves in
energy, physical ability, cognition and general health.”8
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Like the now-withdrawn Alabama policy, the Tennessee and Washington
protocols, as well as similar ones in Kansas, Pennsylvania, Utah, and New York, have
recently prompted state and national disability rights organizations, as well as
individuals with disabilities, to file administrative complaints with OCR alleging that
these and other provisions violate the federal disability discrimination laws.9
Although OCR resolved the Alabama complaint after the state withdrew its policy,10
Id.
HHS Press Office, OCR Reaches Early Case Resolution with Alabama After It Removes
Discriminatory
Ventilator
Triaging
Guidelines
(Apr.
8,
2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/04/08/ocr-reaches-early-case-resolution-alabama-after-itremoves-discriminatory-ventilator-triaging.html [https://perma.cc/L9XX-DCAN].
6
Ari Ne’eman, “I Will Not Apologize for My Needs,” N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/opinion/coronavirus-ventilators-triage-disability.html
[https://perma.cc/VBK9-5LT4]. See the discussion in Letter from Lisa Primm, Disability Rights Tenn.,
to Roger Severino, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Mar. 27, 2020),
http://thearc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2020-03-27-TN-OCR-Complaint-re-HealthcareRationing-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/ACT4-BMPX].
7 Letter from David Carlson, Disability Rights Wash., to Roger Severino, Dir., Office for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 12 (Mar. 23, 2020) (quoting the hospital’s policy),
https://www.centerforpublicrep.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/OCR-Complaint_3-23-20-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KD72-Z8CS].
8 Id. at 13 (quoting the policy).
9 See id. The Center for Public Representation maintains an updated website compiling these
complaints.
See
COVID-19
Medical
Rationing,
CTR. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION,
https://www.centerforpublicrep.org/covid-19-medical-rationing [https://perma.cc/R37B-QJ85]. I am
among the counsel to the complainants in several of these matters.
10 See HHS Press Office, supra note 5.
4
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and issued more general guidance addressing the issue,11 the other complaints
remain pending. And the broader issue remains a live one.
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In this Essay, written as this crisis unfolds, I argue that disability-based
distinctions like these do indeed violate the law. The Americans with Disabilities Act,
the Rehabilitation Act, and the Affordable Care Act all prohibit health-care providers
from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities because of their
disabilities. The explicit discrimination embodied in policies like those of Washington
State, on its face, violates these prohibitions. Nor can medical providers simply define
disabled patients as being “unqualified” because of disabilities that do not make them
unable to benefit from treatment for the condition that they seek to ameliorate.
Longstanding and authoritative interpretations of the law bar the use of such circular
techniques to insulate disability discrimination from legal challenge.
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A proper interpretation of the law may permit medical providers to use
disability as a basis for a rationing decision where an individual’s underlying
disability does make the individual unable to benefit from coronavirus treatment—
either because that disability interferes with the treatment itself, or because the
underlying disability will kill the individual in the very near term regardless of the
treatment’s success in addressing the virus. But those circumstances will be narrow.
And a proper interpretation of the law requires assurances that such imminent-death
determinations will be made based on the best available objective evidence, free from
bias against people with disabilities or devaluation of their lives.
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Under this interpretation of the law, which I argue is the best interpretation
of the existing legal materials, medical providers would retain substantial discretion
to make resource-allocation decisions in a time of triage. They could make decisions
based on non-disability factors. And where those factors do not dictate a decision,
health systems would not be limited to a first-come, first-serve approach. They could
employ any other disability-neutral procedure that fits their professional judgment.
Even a lottery would be fairer and more democratically legitimate than placing the
burden on disabled individuals—individuals who already experience disadvantage as
a result of societal discrimination, and who disproportionately lack access to the
political and health-system processes that frame policies concerning medical
rationing. But my point is not to defend a lottery or any other allocation procedure.
Rather, my point is to argue that the law, best understood, rules out a protocol that
puts disabled people at the back of the line because they have pre-existing medical
conditions that do not make them unable to benefit from the treatment they seek.
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In this Essay, I defend that reading of the law. Part I demonstrates that
practices that expressly use disability as a factor in denying life-saving treatment
discriminate because of a disability. Part II argues that it would be inconsistent with
the law for a health system to treat a pre-existing disability as rendering an

See Office for Civil Rights, Bulletin: Civil Rights, HIPAA, and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVIDDEP’T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.
(Mar.
28,
2020),
19),
U.S.
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr-bulletin-3-28-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL3K-NPZE].
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individual un-“qualified” for treatment for a new condition—at least where the preexisting condition does not make the individual unable to benefit from the treatment.
And Part III addresses the one significant body of legal precedent that might at first
glance appear to stand in the way of these conclusions—the “Baby Doe” cases that
date to the 1980s. As that Part shows, those cases conflict with more recent,
authoritative developments in the law. And they do not apply to the COVID-19
situation even on their own terms.
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There are three major federal statutes that prohibit disability discrimination
in the medical treatment context: the Americans with Disabilities Act; Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act; and Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act. The ADA
prohibits disability-based discrimination by state and local government agencies in
its Title II,12 and it prohibits disability-based discrimination by private health-care
providers in its Title III.13 Section 504 prohibits disability-based discrimination by
federal executive-branch agencies and recipients of federal financial assistance.14
And Section 1557 prohibits disability-based discrimination by health programs that
receive federal financial assistance or are operated under a federal program or
activity.15
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Despite some slight variations in language, each of these statutes prohibits
discrimination against individuals with disabilities because of their disabilities. And
except for ADA Title III, all require that the disabled individual be “qualified” for the
benefit or treatment they seek. Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,” be “subjected to
discrimination” by a state or local government.16 Title III of the same statute says
that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation.”17 Section 504 phrases the
prohibition in this way: “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability” shall,
“solely by reason of her or his disability,” be “subjected to discrimination under” a
federally assisted program.18 And Section 1557 incorporates by reference the
discrimination prohibition in Section 504.19

rin

This Essay raises two interpretive issues relevant to medical rationing
decisions. First, are those decisions being made “by reason of” or “on the basis of”
disability? Second, are the disabled individuals affected by those decisions “qualified”
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018).
Id. § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2018); see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 629 (1998) (stating that
Title III’s definition of a covered “public accommodation” includes a private health-care provider).
14 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018).
15 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557(a), 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2018).
16 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018).
17 Id. § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2018).
18 An Act to Replace the Vocational Rehabilitation Act § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018).
19 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557(a), 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2018).
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for the treatment they seek? I deal with the issue of qualification in Part II of this
Essay. Here, I briefly discuss the issue of discrimination because of disability.

vie

Many of the rationing protocols health-care providers have been preparing to
use in response to COVID-19 plainly inflict discrimination “by reason of” or “on the
basis of” disability. Disability is an explicit factor used to deny treatment—a factor
that will be decisive in many cases.20 The protocols raise none of the difficult issues
that often stymie claims of disability discrimination: identifying discriminatory
intent, determining appropriate reasonable accommodations, or delimiting the scope
of the prohibition on disparate impact.21 Rather, they are straightforward examples
of making treatment decisions because of disability. The harder question, to which I
now turn, is that of qualification.

re

II. Are Disabled Individuals “Qualified” for Life-Saving Treatment?
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The major disability rights statutes generally limit their protection to
“qualified” individuals with disabilities. ADA Title II defines a “qualified” individual
as someone “who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices,” meets “the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or
the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.”22 The
Rehabilitation Act does not contain text defining “qualified” (or “otherwise qualified,”
the language used by Section 504), but cases under the statute apply a similar rule:
an individual is “otherwise qualified” if that individual is able, with “reasonable
accommodation” if necessary, to perform the “essential functions” of the job or meet
the eligibility requirements for a program.23 (ADA Title III, notably, includes no
“qualified” limitation.)
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A. The General Rule: Disability as Such May Not Be a Basis for
Disqualification
The most plausible legal defense of disability-based medical rationing rules is
that the affected individuals’ disabilities render them un-“qualified” for the lifeSee supra text accompanying notes 6-8. Section 504, unlike the ADA, requires proof of discrimination
“solely by reason of” disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018). Where disability status is the determinative
factor in a decision, the courts have treated the “solely” requirement as satisfied. For example, in Lovell
v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1053 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003), the court concluded
that the state violated Section 504 even though it was not the plaintiffs’ disability alone, but instead
their disability combined with the failure to satisfy a “restrictive income and assets test,” that led to
their exclusion from Medicaid. “[B]ut for their disability,” the court explained, the plaintiffs would
have received Medicaid under the state’s QUEST program. Id. As a result, “those disabled persons
were denied QUEST coverage by the State solely because of their disabilities; that is, had they been
nondisabled, they would have received QUEST coverage.” Id.
21 For an argument that medical rationing—even if not based on explicit disability classifications—is
illegal when it has a forbidden disparate impact on disabled people, see Deborah Hellman & Kate
Nicholson, Rationing and Disability in a State of Crisis (Va. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research
Paper No. 2020-33), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3570088 [https://perma.cc/QTN4-H9LR].
22 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 201(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2018).
23 Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 n.17 (1987). As noted above, Section 1557 incorporates
Section 504’s discrimination prohibition by reference.
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saving treatment they seek. In times of triage—for example, when there are not
enough ventilators and other resources to go around—a health system needs to deny
these resources to some people who need them to survive. So long as medical
professionals adopt reasonable criteria for making these sorts of tragic choices,24 the
argument would go, those criteria should constitute the qualifications for the relevant
benefit. And here, the argument would continue, it is reasonable to choose people
without underlying disabilities in rationing these scarce resources, because they
would benefit more from receiving life-saving treatment. They would (by hypothesis)
live longer lives afterwards, they would enjoy their lives more, and they would
contribute more economically to society.
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Whatever one thinks as a philosophical or policy matter about rationing
treatment based on quality-adjusted life years—an issue on which there is
contentious debate25—the argument that medical professionals can simply define
disability as disqualifying seems directly foreclosed by legal precedent. In Alexander
v. Choate, one of its early cases under Section 504, the Supreme Court recognized
that states could not permissibly evade the bar on disability discrimination simply by
turning the absence of a disability into a qualification for a job or benefit:
“Antidiscrimination legislation can obviously be emptied of meaning if every
discriminatory policy is ‘collapsed’ into one’s definition of what is the relevant
benefit.”26 Thus, the Court held that “[t]he benefit itself, of course, cannot be defined
in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the
meaningful access to which they are entitled.”27
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To adopt the absence of an underlying disability as a qualification for receiving
life-saving treatment would, at least on its face, appear to conflict with that principle.
The disability discrimination laws appear to erect a strong rule that disability as such
may never be the basis for denying individuals opportunities.

rin

To be sure, an individual’s disability may make it impossible or impracticable
for them to satisfy certain eligibility criteria, even if the criteria are defined with no
reference to disability. For example, a state may legitimately demand that bus drivers
operate their vehicles safely; with current technology, blindness is simply
inconsistent with that requirement. Safe operation of motor vehicles is an interest
that can be defined without any reference to disability. The recognition that some
The obligatory citation is to GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
For a disability-focused critique, see NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, QUALITY-ADJUSTED LIFE YEARS
AND
THE
DEVALUATION
OF
LIFE
WITH
A
DISABILITY
(2019),
https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Quality_Adjusted_Life_Report_508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P2V6-4NX4]. For a nice summary of the ethical literature on the problematic nature
of relying on QALYs in this way, see Jerome Bickenbach, Disability and Health Care Rationing,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/disability-care-rationing [https://perma.cc/ABU7NUUS].
26 469 U.S. 287, 301 n.21 (1985) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 29 n.36, 469 U.S. at 301 (No. 83-727)).
27 Id. at 301.
24
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disabilities, given the current state of technology, are simply incompatible with that
interest reflects a simple and uncontroversial empirical judgment.
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But disability in the medical rationing context is different. Refusing to allocate
scarce treatment resources to patients with pre-existing disabilities does not rest on
a simple and uncontroversial empirical question. It rests on a series of value
judgments: What should we be seeking to maximize when we allocate scarce healthcare resources? Lives saved, quality of life, prospective economic output of those we
save? How do we determine quality of life? Do impairments to physical or mental
functions necessarily limit an individual’s quality of life? What if the people who
experience those impairments do not think so?28 It is practically difficult, if not
conceptually impossible, to disentangle our answers to those questions from our
judgments about disability and the value of life with a disability.29
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Even when we answer what seem like the purely empirical questions here, our
answers are likely to be inflected by our underlying views about disability and by
(overt or implicit) biases against disabled people. Medical rationing decisions are
made in times of great uncertainty.30 They involve prognoses (about the possibility of
recovery and the length and quality of life following recovery) that are themselves
uncertain. It is natural for anyone deciding under such conditions to be guided by
their underlying values and biases (even if only unconsciously) in resolving those
uncertainties. And there is ample evidence of widespread bias against people with

For a discussion of these issues, see infra text accompanying notes 46-53.
Arti Rai argues, for example, that refusing to provide a liver transplant to a person who walks with
a cane, out of a concern that an alternative recipient of the liver who has no underlying impairment
will experience a higher quality of life, “would systematically allocate medical resources away from all
individuals with disabilities, no matter how amenable their other health difficulties were to medical
treatment.” Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015, 1080-81 (1997). Such a decision, although expressed in quality-oflife terms, would in fact betray a “much broader, highly problematic purpose of categorically judging
all persons with disabilities less worthy than nondisabled persons of receiving any sort of medical
treatment.” Id. at 1081.
30 For this reason, the influential bioethicists who wrote a recent piece on COVID-19 and rationing in
the New England Journal of Medicine argue that “[l]imited time and information during an
emergency . . . counsel against incorporating patients’ future quality of life, and quality-adjusted lifeyears, into benefit maximization.” Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Fair Allocation of Scarce Medical
Resources in the Time of Covid-19, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsb2005114 [https://perma.cc/S42H-3G59]. As I argue
below, the same concerns that counsel against using quality-of-life measures to assess a treatment’s
benefit also counsel against using quantity-of-life measures such as the number of expected life-years
saved. See infra text accompanying notes 57-Error! Bookmark not defined..
28
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disabilities among medical professionals31—a problem that is exacerbated by the
underrepresentation of disabled people among their ranks.32

vie

Philosophers could debate how we should answer these questions. Some,
following the views of people like Peter Singer, might argue that many disabilities
inherently limit the quality of life and that the quality of life ought to be central in
determining how we should allocate scarce societal resources.33 Others might take
the view that national productivity is the most important factor. 34 Still others might
disagree and argue that the quality of life is inherently subjective and that a purely
productivity-focused view improperly reduces human beings to nothing more than
“embodied net marginal product.”35
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Wherever we might come down on the philosophical debate, the disability
discrimination statutes resolve them for purposes of the law—at least insofar as the
question is whether the absence of a disability can in and of itself be a qualification
for needed medical treatment. Congress decided to bar the use of disability, standing
alone, as a (dis)qualification for the receipt of needed benefits from the government
or other medical providers. That decision may have reflected a fear that disabilitybased decisions will reflect irrational bias, or perhaps some broader commitment to

See, e.g., Carol J. Gill, Health Professionals, Disability, and Assisted Suicide: An Examination of
Relevant Empirical Evidence and Reply to Batavia, 6 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 526, 530 (2000); Tom
Shakespeare, Lisa I. Iezzoni & Nora E. Groce, Disability and the Training of Health Professionals, 374
LANCET 1815 (2009); see generally MEDICAL FUTILITY AND DISABILITY BIAS, NAT’L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY
29
(Nov.
20,
2019),
https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Medical_Futility_Report_508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MY6333FZ] (“Several studies have demonstrated that health care providers’ opinions about the quality of
life of a person with a disability significantly differ from the actual experiences of those people. For
example, one study found that only 17 percent of providers anticipated an average or better quality of
life after a spinal cord injury (SCI) compared with 86 percent of the actual SCI comparison group. The
same study found that only 18 percent of emergency care providers imagined that they would be glad
to be alive after experiencing a spinal cord injury, in contrast to the 92 percent of actual SCI survivors.”
(footnotes omitted)); Letter from David Carlson to Roger Severino, supra note 7, at 8-11 (collecting
extensive evidence of medical bias against disability).
32 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Technical Standards and Lawsuits Involving Accommodations for Health
Professions Students, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 1010, 1010 (2016).
33 For Peter Singer’s views on using quality of life in resource-allocation decisions, see JOHN MCKIE,
PETER SINGER, HELGA KUHSE & JEFF RICHARDSON, THE ALLOCATION OF HEALTH CARE RESOURCES: AN
ETHICAL EVALUATION OF THE “QALY” APPROACH (Routledge ed. 1998). For Singer’s views on disability
and the quality of life, see Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 15,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/magazine/19healthcare-t.html [https://perma.cc/7YAYAVZ5].
34 For a description, and critique, of this argument, see Andrew H. Smith & John Rother, Older
Americans and the Rationing of Health Care, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1847, 1853 (1992) (“Some would justify
the withholding of expensive medical services to older persons on the basis of the decreased
productivity of the elderly.”).
35 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 876-880 (2003). The phrase comes from Mark Kelman,
Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 835 (2001).
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disability equality. The legislative history is not specific. But the crucial point is that
Congress made the decision.
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One good reason to treat the disability discrimination laws as resolving these
debates relates to democratic legitimacy. People with disabilities have faced a long
history of exclusion from democratic participation.36 Often, that exclusion has been
overt, as in the denial of the right to vote to those under guardianship.37 Other times,
the exclusion has resulted from an accumulation of decisions that made it impossible
for many disabled people to have access to the political process.38 When government
institutions make decisions that deny people with disabilities important benefits, we
should worry that those decisions lack legitimacy. They were likely taken without the
equal participation of those who are the most affected. We should especially worry
when the immediate consequences of those decisions are life and death.
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By contrast, the political process that led to the enactment of the disability
discrimination laws did not exclude the nondisabled. As a group, the nondisabled are
more likely to lose out from a move that denies medical providers the ability to make
disability disqualifying for scarce life-saving treatments. When a group passes a law
to put burdens on itself, there is little reason to worry that it is failing to take account
of the full array of costs.39 Perhaps it is best to think of the enactment of the ADA
and its sibling laws as a veil-of-ignorance moment. Members of Congress restricted
the use of disability as a qualification for important benefits while accountable largely
to members of the nondisabled public who did not know whether they would ever
become disabled. That decision has more presumptive legitimacy than an ex post
decision by those operating the health-care system, who at that point know precisely
who is and is not disabled, to place the burden of resource scarcity on disabled
individuals—the very individuals who are most likely to have been excluded from
such decisions.
B. Does Defining the Qualification as “[Comparative] Ability to Benefit”
Solve the Problem?
1. The General Argument

rin

What if we were to take the concept of qualification up a level of generality?
Defenders of disability-based rationing might say that the relevant qualification for
medical treatment is not the absence of disability but the ability to benefit from the
For a good discussion of the history of disability-based restrictions on the right to vote, see Kay
Schriner, Lisa Ochs & Todd Shields, Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA and Voting Rights of
People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 437 (2000).
37 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Universalism, Social Rights, and Citizenship, 39 CARDOZO L.
REV. 413, 423-24 (2017).
38 See Matt Vasilogambros, How Voters with Disabilities Are Blocked from the Ballot Box, STATELINE
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/02/01/howvoters-with-disabilities-are-blocked-from-the-ballot-box [https://perma.cc/F6GM-MVYA].
39 Cf. John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723,
727 (1974) (“regardless of whether it is wise or unwise, it is not ‘suspect’ in a constitutional sense for
a majority, any majority, to discriminate against itself”).
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treatment. And just like blindness and the bus driver, perhaps disability in many
circumstances just makes it impossible (given current technology) to benefit from a
treatment. If a person has a pre-existing condition such as advanced cancer that will
inevitably kill them in the next week, and they then acquire coronavirus, is it sensible
to say that they will benefit from ventilator treatment for their new disease if they
are going to die so soon anyway? Such a person, one might say, is not qualified for
treatment for the new condition.

re

vie

And if we are in a triage situation, one might argue, the relevant qualification
is not the ability to benefit in some absolute sense but the relative ability to benefit.
If there simply are not enough life-saving treatments to go around, might a healthcare provider reasonably determine that the people who should get those treatments
are the ones who are likely to live the longest, or live the fullest lives, as a result of
the treatment? What makes a person “qualified” for treatment, on this view, is that
the treatment will offer that person a higher marginal number of life years or qualityadjusted life years than the next person.
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One might go further: Perhaps one’s disability is relevant to that question even
if one will not die immediately after receiving the treatment. If I have a pre-existing
medical condition that will cause me to die ten years after receiving a successful
treatment for my coronavirus, maybe we should give the treatment instead to
someone whose post-treatment life expectancy is longer. There is a widespread
(though hardly universal) intuition that we should give scarce life-saving treatments
to younger people before we give them to older people.40 Perhaps the same principle
should apply when a pre-existing disability will predictably shorten the posttreatment life of one patient vis-à-vis another. More controversially, if I have a preexisting medical condition that means that my life will be of a lower quality than that
of another patient after receiving a successful treatment for my coronavirus, maybe
we should give the treatment to the other patient.

rin

In times of extreme triage of specific treatments, these arguments of course
deserve serious consideration. But there are substantial problems with them. One
relates to democratic legitimacy. At any given moment, there is always scarcity of all
sorts of health-care inputs.41 Even if, as the economists insist, scarcity is itself a basic
fact of life, the pattern of which products and resources are scarce in any given place
and time is significantly the result of societal decisions. That is especially true in the
richest society in human history—one whose health system has a well-documented
problem of waste and inefficiency.42 As Frank Pasquale argues, “The current scarcity
For a review of arguments for age-based rationing, see Smith & Rother, supra note 34, at 1852-1855.
See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Ethical Issues in the Use of Cost Effectiveness Analysis for the Prioritization
of Health Resources, in HANDBOOK OF BIOETHICS: TAKING STOCK OF THE FIELD FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVE 353, 353 (George Khushf, ed., 2004) (“Resources to improve health are and always have
been scarce, in the sense that health must compete with other desirable social goals like education and
personal security for resources”).
42 See, e.g., Austin Frakt, The Huge Waste in the U.S. Health System, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/upshot/health-care-waste-study.html
[https://perma.cc/5B5VVCEB].
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of care for the least well off is not a natural feature of the world; rather, it is
epiphenomenal of repeated decisions not to impose certain tax burdens today even
though they would have seemed perfectly fair 50 years ago.”43

vie

Disabled people have a disproportionately small amount of input into decisions
about the operation of the health system. They are underrepresented among the
ranks of health professionals who constitute the system, and they experience
significant barriers to participating in the democratic process that regulates the
system.44 A significant point of the disability discrimination laws is to rectify these
sorts of inequalities by forcing institutions to take equal account of the interests of
disabled people when they make their decisions.
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The perceived need to deny ventilators to coronavirus patients with preexisting disabilities results not from scarcity as a natural fact, but from two societal
decisions: first, the decision to fail to maintain an adequate stock of ventilators to
serve all patients who would need them if a pandemic breaks out45; second, the
decision once a pandemic breaks out to use patients’ pre-existing disabilities as a
basis for denying them the use of those devices. A process in which people with
disabilities were equally represented vis-à-vis the nondisabled, and in which the
interests of both groups were given equal concern, would not lead to both of these
decisions. An equal process might instead have chosen to obviate the second decision
by maintaining a sufficient stock of ventilators to serve every patient in the event of
a pandemic. Or it might well have found the costs of such a policy to be extravagant
when considered in light of the other possible uses of societal resources. But it would
not then place all of the burden of that decision on individuals with pre-existing
disabilities. The combination of both of these policies—allowing scarcity of
ventilators, while imposing the life-or-death costs of that scarcity most heavily on
disabled people—bespeaks a failure of democratic legitimacy.
2. The Problem with Disability-Based Quality-of-Life Judgments

rin

But there are other problems as well. When medical professionals or others
determine that a disability limits the quality of a person’s life, they are making a
controversial normative judgment that often does not reflect the views of disabled
persons themselves. “A massive body of research has demonstrated that people who
acquire a range of disabilities typically do not experience much or any permanent

Frank Pasquale, The Hippocratic Math: How Much Should Society Spend on Health Care, 32 J.
LEGAL MED. 529, 535-36 (2011) (reviewing M. GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH: WHY DOCTORS
ARE UNDER PRESSURE TO RATION CARE, PRACTICE POLITICS, AND COMPROMISE THEIR PROMISE TO HEAL
(2011)).
44 See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
45 See, e.g., Lena H. Sun, Inside the Secret U.S. Stockpile Meant to Save Us All in a Bioterror Attack,
WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2018, 6:00 AM ET), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-yourhealth/wp/2018/04/24/inside-the-secret-u-s-stockpile-meant-to-save-us-all-in-a-bioterror-attack
[https://perma.cc/HMH2-PNXS] (noting that the budget for the CDC’s Strategic National Stockpile
“hasn’t always been able to keep up with the program’s ever-growing list of needs”).
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reduction in the enjoyment of life.”46 Elizabeth Emens has extensively detailed the
differences between what she calls the “inside” and “outside” views of disability:

vie

From the outside, disability commonly looks like an unhappy
place created by an individual medical problem for which the law
sometimes provides special benefits to that individual. From the inside,
disability often looks like a mundane feature of a no-less-happy life,
rendered inconvenient or disabling largely by interactions with the
surrounding environment, which legal accommodations alter in ways
that sometimes provide benefits to many.47
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To choose the “outside” view of disability held by most nondisabled people over
the “inside” view held by many disabled people themselves reflects a normative
choice.48 That choice might result from the devaluation of life with a disability—
something that seems to fly in the face of the disability discrimination laws’
guarantee of equal treatment. Or it might result from a form of paternalism—an
understanding that people without disabilities are better judges of the quality of a
disabled life than are people with disabilities. “[P]aternalism has historically been
one of the most significant contributors to the disadvantage people with disabilities
experience.”49 And paternalism was a principal target of the disability discrimination
laws.50 Given the well-documented evidence of bias by members of the medical
profession against disability,51 we should be especially concerned that these
judgments are being made in a way that suppresses disabled people’s interests and
reinforces the problem of democratic legitimacy.

tn
ot

To the extent that disabilities do harm the quality of one’s life, that is often
because of discrimination and societal decisions that have rendered significant
opportunities inaccessible.52 To use those harms as a justification for denying lifesaving treatment to disabled people imposes a form of “double jeopardy.” Societal
discrimination against people with disabilities causes them to experience less full
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Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability,
60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 763 (2007).
47 Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383, 1386.
48 See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 46, at 776 (“The assumed neutral baseline of non-disability
is not, in fact, neutral; the preferences and experiences of people without disabilities are just as
conditioned by their situations as are those of people with disabilities. Neither people with nor those
without disabilities have epistemic access to the “true” enjoyment of life with a disability.” (footnotes
omitted)).
49 Id. at 795.
50 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rational
Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923, 932 n.70 (2004).
51 See, e.g., supra note 31.
52 See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Distracted by Disability, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 77, 80
(1998).
46
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lives, which social institutions then offer as a reason for making the further decision
to deny these already disadvantaged individuals essential benefits.53

re
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Considerations like these led the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), in the George H.W. Bush Administration, to reject the 1992 Oregon healthreform plan. Oregon’s plan implemented a form of rationing. HHS Secretary Louis
Sullivan concluded that the rationing relied on quality-of-life surveys that
“quantifie[d] stereotypic assumptions about persons with disabilities.”54 And when
Oregon’s health commissioners conducted their own rankings of which conditions and
treatments to prioritize, they relied on factors “including ‘quality of life’ and ‘ability
to function’”—factors that, in Sullivan’s view, “expressly value a person without a
disability more highly than a person with a disability in the allocation of medical
treatment.”55 As a result, he concluded, the proposed rationing plan did not comply
with the ADA.56
3. The Problem with Disability-Based Quantity-of-Life Judgments

pe
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What about future life expectancy? A recent article in the New England
Journal of Medicine co-authored by a number of influential bioethicists agrees that
the rationing of life-saving treatment should not take account of assessments of a
patient’s future quality of life, but that it should rest on assessments of future
quantity of life.57 At least outside of the case in which it is clear that a person’s
underlying disability will make them unable to benefit from coronavirus treatment—
either because that disability interferes with the treatment itself, or because the
underlying disability will kill the individual in the very near term regardless of the
success of the treatment—consideration of the life-expectancy impact of the disability
does not accord with the legal principles I have just discussed.

tn
ot

The intuition that age is an appropriate rationing criterion might lead us to
think that the expected quantity of life should be treated differently than the expected
quality of life. We should recall, however, that even if many people agree that age is

See John Harris, QALYfying the Value of Life, 13 J. MED. ETHICS 117, 119-20 (1987). Harris’s version
of the “double jeopardy” argument takes for granted that disability inherently limits the value of life.
See id. at 120 (“The first disaster leaves her with a poor quality of life and QALYS then require that
in virtue of this she be ruled out as a candidate for lifesaving treatment, or at best, that she be given
little or no chance of benefiting from what little amelioration her condition admits of.”). If one believes
that disability does not inherently limit the value of life, but does so largely if not exclusively as a
result of society’s treatment of people with disabilities, the double jeopardy point becomes even more
powerful. For criticism of Harris’s “double jeopardy” argument—albeit criticism that, like Harris, fails
to appreciate the role of societal decisions in causing the harm attached to disability—see MCKIE ET
AL., supra note 33, at 85-97.
54 ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 397, 410 (1994).
55 Id. at 411.
56 See id. at 409-12. For a discussion of the Oregon experience, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1507-09 (2001).
57 See Emanuel et al., supra note 30.
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an appropriate criterion, not everyone does.58 Among those who do not are the HHS
Office for Civil Rights, which recently declared that the Age Discrimination Act of
1975 prohibits treatment decisions founded on “judgments about a person’s relative
‘worth’ based on,” among other things, “age.”59
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Even if we focus on those who do agree that age is an appropriate criterion, it
is far from clear that they hold that position because they believe health systems
should maximize the number of life-years saved. Many people defend the use of age
based on grounds that are backward rather than forward looking—“the feeling that
everyone is entitled to some ‘normal’ span of health (usually expressed in terms of life
years, e.g. ‘three score years and ten’).”60 The implication is that anyone failing to
achieve this has in some sense been cheated, whilst anyone getting more than this is
‘living on borrowed time’.”61 On this view, we may legitimately deny treatment to
people who have already had their “fair innings” if that is necessary to protect others
from being cheated out of the same opportunity.62 But that does not mean that we
believe that “each life year is equally valuable,”63 or even that we should always prefer
saving the younger person to saving the older person. For example, one bioethicist
who purports to “support age-related rationing for COVID-19 patients” argues that,
“when the demand outstrips the supply” of ventilators, those devices should not be
given to patients who are eighty or older.64 He contends that “people who have
reached that milestone have enjoyed an opportunity to live a complete life.”65 But that
reasoning does not rest on the principle that the health system should maximize the
expected life years saved. For example, a “complete life” or “fair innings” principle
would treat a twenty-five year-old the same as a thirty-five year old, even though
saving the younger patient would, all else equal, maximize the number of expected
life years.
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ot

Moreover, reliance on expected number of years of survival as a justification
for explicitly disability-based rationing raises many of the same concerns about
democratic legitimacy, medical bias, and double jeopardy that reliance on quality-oflife measures does. Once again, we would be forcing disabled individuals to face
deadly consequences because of societal decisions not to invest in sufficient
treatments—decisions from which people with disabilities disproportionately lack
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For an argument that the use of age as a medical-rationing criterion may violate the federal Age
Discrimination Act, see Jessica Dunsay Silver, From Baby Doe to Grandpa Doe: The Impact of the
Federal Age Discrimination Act on the “Hidden” Rationing of Medical Care, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 993
(1988).
59 Office for Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 1.
60 Alan Williams, Intergenerational Equity: An Exploration of the ‘Fair Innings’ Argument, 6 HEALTH
ECON. 117, 119 (1997).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Sean Hannon Williams, Statistical Children, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 103 (2013).
64 Franklin G. Miller, Why I Support Age-Related Rationing of Ventilators for Covid-19 Patients, HAST.
BIOETHICS F. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.thehastingscenter.org/why-i-support-age-related-rationingof-ventilators-for-covid-19-patients [https://perma.cc/8GHS-FZ4R].
65 Id.
58
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access. Once again, we would be relying on medical judgments that are likely to be
inflected by bias.66 And once again, we would be denying life-saving treatment at least
in part because of societal discrimination—for discrimination against disabled
individuals plays a key role in the poor health outcomes some of them experience.67
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Society does not, of course, universally endorse expected number of years of
survival as a basis for discrimination in the provision of life-saving treatment. Nor
should it. For example, there remains a gap in life expectancy between African
Americans and whites, despite real progress in recent years.68 There is also a
substantial and growing gap between richer and poorer people.69 Yet few would
defend rationing ventilators based on a patient’s race or wealth—even if it would be
a good proxy for number of years of expected survival following treatment. We
recognize that race and wealth are morally arbitrary for these purposes, that
minorities and poor people were disproportionately excluded from the decisions about
how to invest in health care, and that requiring them to forgo life-saving treatment
because of their groups’ poor life expectancy inflicts a kind of double jeopardy.70 The
disability discrimination laws place disability on a similar plane.

Medical professionals “often place too heavy a clinical focus on the disability, such that it
‘overshadows’ the acute reason for their visit.” MEDICAL FUTILITY AND DISABILITY BIAS, supra note 31,
at 31 & n.81 (collecting sources). Moreover, “few physicians have the expertise and training necessary
to accurately diagnose and treat people with disabilities; often, they simply do not know how to apply
diagnostic standards to people who physically or mentally deviate from the statistical norm, or they
fail to differentiate the conditions associated with the individual’s disability from the acute symptoms
behind their medical visit.” Id. at 31 & n.82 (collecting sources). And in many situations doctors “use
functional limitations as a proxy for determining vital organ functioning,” which leads them to
“misinterpret[]” the limitations attendant to disability as organ damage—a factor that could readily
lead to an inaccurate prognosis for a disabled patient. Id. at 71 n.82.
67 See Tara Lagu, Christine Griffin & Peter K. Lindenauer, Ensuring Access to Health Care for Patients
with Disabilities, 175 JAMA INTERN. MED. 157, 157 (2015) (“Patients with disabilities face barriers
when they attempt to access health care. These barriers include physical barriers to entering health
care establishments, lack of accessible equipment, lack of a safe method for transferring the patient to
an examination table, and the lack of policies that facilitate access.”); Silvia Yee et al., Compounded
Disparities: Health Equity at the Intersection of Disability, Race, and Ethnicity 39 (2017),
https://dredf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Compounded-Disparities-Intersection-of-DisabilitiesRace-and-Ethnicity.pdf [https://perma.cc/849K-V36T] (“Negative attitudes toward and assumptions
about disabilities have an adverse effect on the health and quality of health care for people with
disabilities.”).
68 See, e.g., Joel Achenbach, Life Expectancy Improves for Blacks, and the Racial Gap is Closing, CDC
POST,
May
2,
2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-yourReports,
WASH.
health/wp/2017/05/02/cdc-life-expectancy-up-for-blacks-and-the-racial-gap-is-closing/
(“Blacks
in
every age group under 65 continue to have significantly higher death rates than whites. Black life
expectancy at birth is about 3½ years lower than that of whites.”).
69 See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States,
2001-2014, 315 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1750 (2016).
70 For an analysis along these lines, that equates disability with other “personal characteristics” that
could be used to justify “discriminat[ion] against . . . a class,” see Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health
Care Morally, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1516 (1994). As Elhauge explains, if “a person's medical
disability were taken into account in determining that person's right to treatment for all other

Pr

ep

rin

tn
ot

pe

66

15
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2020
15
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559926

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 169 [2020]

vie

we
d

In a forthcoming piece, Govind Persad defends the use of disability-based
criteria that may result in exclusion from life-saving care when those criteria are
based on quantity-of-life, but not quality-of-life judgments.71 He begins with a factual
premise: People whose disabilities lead to deprioritization under such exclusions are
likely to make up a small minority of the overall population of people with disabilities
who need treatment. Based on that premise, Persad argues that denying life-saving
treatment to those whose disabilities will predictably shorten their post-recovery
lives will be better for people with disabilities “as a group” than the alternatives,
because it will enable limited treatments to save more lives overall. Such triage
practices “save[] more people with disabilities than random selection, even if disabled
people would comprise a greater proportion of the (smaller) number saved under
random selection.”72
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But there are three problems with that argument. First, his factual premises,
while in some respects plausible, are neither obvious nor proven. Whether or not more
people with disabilities will benefit from a policy containing disability-based
exclusions depends on a comparison of the distribution of disabled people in two
different groups. The first group is the population to whom the policy denies lifesaving treatment. The second is the population to whom the policy provides lifesaving treatment. Whether more people with disabilities will benefit from the
disability-based exclusion also depends on the resources (such as time occupying a
scarce ventilator) that would be consumed by members of each population if they were
to be provided treatment. The ADA’s definition of disability is broad, and Persad is
surely correct that “[m]ost pre-existing disabilities do not affect” either “patients’
prospect of benefit or the quantity of resources they need.”73 But the population that
needs scarce life-saving treatment is unlikely to be drawn randomly from the
underlying population. We thus cannot know that a policy explicitly denying
treatment to some individuals based on their disabilities is going to benefit more
people with disabilities overall.

rin

Second, antidiscrimination laws protect individuals. An employer who refuses
to hire a woman for a particular job because she is a woman has illegally
discriminated on the basis of sex even if it hires other women.74 A fair “bottom-line”
distribution of benefits and burdens across groups does not provide a defense to
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illnesses, then the claim of a form of double jeopardy would have considerable force. For then, having
suffered the first illness, the person's claim to all future medical treatment of other illnesses would be
discounted.” Id.
71 See Govind Persad, Why Disability Law Permits Evidence-Based Triage in a Pandemic, 130 YALE
L.J.F. (forthcoming June 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3571139.
72 Id. at __ (manuscript at 11-12).
73 Id. at __ (manuscript at 11).
74 See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543 (1971) (per curiam) (concluding that a
policy that used a sex-based distinction to exclude some women was discrimination under Title VII,
even though “75—80% of those hired for the position [in question] were women”). The Phillips Court
remanded for consideration of the bona fide occupational qualification defense, see id., a defense that
would have been irrelevant if the employer’s practice did not constitute sex discrimination under the
statute.
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proven explicit discrimination against an individual based on a protected category.75
That is a particularly important point in the context of the federal disability
discrimination laws, where the definition of disability is so broad that it covers people
with an immense variety of conditions.76 Maybe denying life-saving treatment to
individuals with cystic fibrosis could save more individuals who take daily medication
for high blood pressure. Both of those conditions count as disabilities under the ADA
and associated statutes. But it would be bizarre to defend such a decision on the
ground that it is better for disabled people “as a group.” The law provides no basis for
such a defense.

re

Finally, Persad’s argument depends on the existence of “evidence-based”
assessments of how a pre-existing disability affects life expectancy—and it depends
on the evidence being good. But the biases I discussed above should lead to great
skepticism about the quality of the “evidence” supporting express disability-based
exclusions or deprioritizations in a rationing plan. A key goal of the
antidiscrimination laws is to counteract those sorts of biases.
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If it is clear that a person’s underlying disability will in fact interfere with the
efficacy of the life-saving treatment, or that the person will die in the immediate term
from that disability with or without that treatment, perhaps it is appropriate to say
that the individual is not qualified. Here we would be applying an absolute criterion
of benefit rather than the relative one that I explored and rejected above.77 But even
here, humility should rule the hour. Medical professionals’ biases often lead them to
make unduly negative prognoses regarding their disabled patients.78 Because
disability rights law is designed significantly as a check on these biases, the law
should not be read to permit health providers to make futility-of-treatment decisions
for their disabled patients absent truly objective, persuasive, and reliable medical
evidence.
The “direct threat” defense that applies when an entity engages in disability
discrimination to prevent a safety risk is instructive here. The law allows such
discrimination based on a determination that the individual poses “a significant risk”
Indeed, the courts have rejected a bottom-line defense even in cases of disparate impact, where
group-based outcomes are an essential part of the plaintiff’s proof. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440 (1982).
76 For discussions of the breadth of the definition of disability, see Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism:
What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 203 (2010); Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A New Universality for
Disability Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937 (2012).
77 Professor David Orentlicher endorses a rule like this one. See David Orentlicher, Destructuring
Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 49, 72-73 (1996) (“[I]f a disabling illness seriously compromises a person’s ability to benefit
from an organ transplant, a physician could deny the person an organ. Otherwise, the physician should
give the person the same opportunity as other candidates to benefit from a transplant.”); see also Rai,
supra note 29, at 1080-81 (arguing that medical resource-allocation decisions should not take account
of underlying disabilities “when the medical efficacy of the intervention is in no way related to the
disability”).
78 See supra notes 31, 66 and accompanying text.
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that “cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”79 Such a determination
must rest on “the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective
evidence” and “an expressly ‘individualized assessment’” of the disabled person.80 The
law imposes these constraints to provide a check on biases that lead to exaggerated
fear of safety risks stemming from disability.81

vie

The widespread nature of medical bias against people with disabilities justifies
a similarly restrictive approach here. Absent a clear, objective basis for concluding
that a person will die in the immediate term as the result of a pre-existing disability—
a determination that should be made through procedures that protect against bias—
the law ought to be read to prohibit using such a disability as a basis for denying lifesaving treatment that the person seeks.82

pe

er

re

This does not mean that medical systems must take a first-come, first-serve
approach to providing life-saving treatment in triage situations. As Secretary
Sullivan explained in his response to the proposed Oregon plan, a system may
consider “a wide range of factors” that are “consistent with the ADA.”83 “These factors
include, but are not limited to, the cost of medical procedures, the length of hospital
stays, prevention of death, and prevention of contagious diseases”—and indeed “any
content neutral factor that does not take disability into account or that does not have
a particular exclusionary effect on persons with disabilities.”84 If a system does not
wish to follow that path, it may allocate treatments on a lottery basis—a process that
many people believe would be more fair.85 But under the best reading of the disability
discrimination laws, they may not deny life-saving treatment simply because a
patient has a pre-existing disability.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2018).
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002) (citing 29 CFR § 1630.2(r) (2001)).
81 See id. at 85-86 & n.5.
82 In addition, the law’s requirements of reasonable modification and reasonable accommodation apply
fully here. They should be understood to require medical systems to take steps to ensure that those
who are not qualified for life-saving treatments can become qualified. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2018)
(requiring “reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural,
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services” where
necessary to enable an individual to “meet[] the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity”); id.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (discrimination includes “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity
can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations”); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,
301 (1985) (“to assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee’s program or
benefit may have to be made” to comply with the Rehabilitation Act).
83 ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, supra note 54, at 411.
84 Id.
85 For a discussion of different approaches, see Sheri Fink, The Hardest Questions Doctors May Face:
TIMES
(Mar.
21,
2020),
Who
Will
Be
Saved?
Who
Won’t?,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/21/us/coronavirus-medical-rationing.html [https://perma.cc/HA27ZYRG].
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III. The “Baby Doe” Cases

vie

My arguments here might seem inconsistent with an older line of lower-court
cases that rejected challenges to the withholding of medical treatment from newborns
with developmental disabilities.86 Those cases, known as the “Baby Doe” cases,
appear to hold that the disability discrimination laws cannot be employed to
challenge medical-treatment decisions. Although they have not been the subject of
much academic discussion in recent years, they do occasionally pop up in litigation.87
Accordingly, it would not be surprising if a health system sought to defend a
disability-based rationing decision by pointing to those cases.
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In the leading “Baby Doe” case, United States v. University Hospital, the
Second Circuit said that the Rehabilitation Act’s “otherwise qualified” language
“cannot be applied in the comparatively fluid context of medical treatment decisions
without distorting its plain meaning.”88 The court asserted that “[i]n common
parlance, one would not ordinarily think of a newborn infant suffering from multiple
birth defects as being ‘otherwise qualified’ to have corrective surgery performed.”89 It
determined that challenges to nontreatment decisions would “invariably require
lengthy litigation primarily involving conflicting expert testimony to determine
whether a decision to treat, or not to treat, or to litigate or not to litigate, was based
on a ‘bona fide medical judgment.’”90 And it concluded, based on a review of the
legislative history, that “[C]ongress never contemplated that section 504 would apply
to treatment decisions of this nature.”91
But there are two significant problems with relying on the “Baby Doe” cases
here: The cases are inconsistent with more recent Supreme Court decisions, and they
do not apply here even on their own terms.
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As we have seen, in the year after University Hospital, the Court concluded in
Choate that entities may not evade the bar on disability discrimination simply by
turning the absence of a disability into a qualification for a benefit.92 By allowing
hospitals to employ an infant’s disability as the basis for determining that the child
was not “qualified” for medical treatment, that is precisely what the “Baby Doe” cases
did.

rin

The “Baby Doe” cases relied on the premise that the disability discrimination
laws apply only in those contexts Congress specifically envisioned.93 But the Supreme
See Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1493 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Univ. Hosp., State
Univ. of N.Y., 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984).
87 A relatively recent example was the Terri Schiavo case. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo,
403 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005).
88 Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 157.
91 Id.; see also Johnson, 971 F.2d at 1493 (adopting the Second Circuit’s rule from University Hospital).
92 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985).
93 See Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d at 157 (“Before ruling that congress intended to spawn this type of
litigation under section 504, we would want more proof than is apparent from the face of the statute.”).
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Court decisively rejected that premise in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v.
Yeskey.94 In Yeskey, the Court held that Title II of the ADA applies to discrimination
against disabled individuals incarcerated in a state’s prison system. Although the
state argued that “Congress did not envisio[n] that the ADA would be applied to state
prisoners,” the Court found that argument “irrelevant.”95 Even “assuming [the state’s
argument] to be true,” the Court held, “the fact that a statute can be ‘applied in
situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It
demonstrates breadth.’”96 Because Title II applies to any disability-based
discrimination by a “public entity,” without making a specific exception for prisons,
the Court refused to read such an exception into the statute. That conclusion fatally
undermines the premise of the “Baby Doe” cases.
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And contrary to the “Baby Doe” cases, the Supreme Court has now twice
recognized that the disability discrimination laws apply in the “context of medical
treatment decisions . . . .”97 In Bragdon v. Abbott,98 the Court applied the ADA to a
dentist’s refusal to treat a patient because she had HIV.99 And in Olmstead v. L.C.,100
the Court held that the ADA imposes significant obligations on states regarding the
provision of mental health treatment. The Olmstead Court disavowed any holding
“that the ADA imposes on the States a ‘standard of care’ for whatever medical services
they render, or that the ADA requires States to ‘provide a certain level of benefits to
individuals with disabilities.’”101 But it specifically held “that States must adhere to
the ADA’s nondiscrimination requirement with regard to the services they in fact
provide.”102
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Notably, when the Supreme Court addressed the “Baby Doe” issue, in Bowen
v. American Hospital Association,103 it did not embrace University Hospital’s position
that the Rehabilitation Act does not cover medical treatment decisions. Justice
Stevens’s plurality opinion rested on a very narrow ground. He concluded that a
hospital’s withholding of treatment to disabled infants did not violate the statute
where the parents of those infants refused to consent to the treatment: “[W]ithout the
consent of the parents or a surrogate decisionmaker the infant is neither ‘otherwise
qualified’ for treatment nor has he been denied care ‘solely by reason of his

524 U.S. 206 (1998).
Id. at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 Id. (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (citation omitted)).
97 Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156.
98 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
99 The Court remanded for determination whether the dentist had a defense because treating the
patient posed a “direct threat” to the health or safety of others in the dental office. See id. at 651-655.
On remand, the First Circuit rejected the direct threat defense, and the Court denied certiorari. See
Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1131 (1999).
100 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
101 Id. at 603 n.14 (internally quoting Thomas, J., dissenting at 623-24).
102 Id.
103 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
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handicap.’”104 Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment to make five votes for
Justice Stevens’s bottom line, but he issued no opinion to explain his reasoning.105

In Bowen, not a single Justice on the Supreme Court endorsed the Second
Circuit’s University Hospital holding. And the Court’s subsequent cases stand in
conflict with the Second Circuit’s decision. Those decisions do not provide a basis for
exempting medical rationing from the disability discrimination laws.
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There is a second reason why the lower-court “Baby Doe” cases cannot save the
discriminatory medical rationing decisions that are being adopted in response to the
coronavirus pandemic. Those cases embraced a rule that the disability discrimination
laws do not apply to a decision to deny treatment based on the disability itself being
treated. The Second Circuit explained its position in University Hospital: “Where the
handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if
ever, be possible to say with certainty that a particular decision was
‘discriminatory.’”106 The Second Circuit’s argument was intuitive. If a disability is the
reason why an individual needs the medical treatment in the first place, how can the
refusal to provide that treatment discriminate on the basis of disability? There is no
comparator who lacks that disability who was being treated better. For this reason,
the Tenth Circuit, in its case relying on University Hospital, specifically distinguished
“hypothesized situations in which the handicap that forms the basis of the section
504 discrimination bears no relation to the medical treatment sought but denied.”107
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The refusal to provide coronavirus treatment to patients with pre-existing
disabilities is precisely the case that the Tenth Circuit distinguished. A pre-existing
condition like a developmental disability “bears no relation to the medical
treatment”—a ventilator—that the challenged protocols will deny the disabled
patient. Here, unlike the situation in which the courts believed themselves to be in
the “Baby Doe” cases, the medical system’s action is the refusal to treat one condition
based on an individual’s having a different disability.108 Even on their own terms, the
“Baby Doe” cases do not bar application of the disability discrimination laws here.
Conclusion

Id. at 630 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 648 (“Chief Justice Burger concurs in the judgment.”)
106 United States v. Univ. Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y., 729 F.2d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 1984).
107 Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1494 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992).
108 I do not mean to endorse the way the “Baby Doe” courts described the cases before them. As I have
previously argued, there is ample basis to conclude that those cases in fact did involve the refusal to
treat one condition based on the child’s having a distinct disabling condition. See SAMUEL R.
BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 365 (2d ed. 2014) (“Based on the facts the
Court presents, the baby needed surgery for spina bifida, but surgery was not performed because she
also had microcephaly and hydrocephalus. The government’s argument, as Judge Winter explains in
dissent, was that other children with spina bifida would have received surgery, and that the reason
Jane Doe did not receive that surgery was because of her other disabilities.”). Whether or not that
conclusion is correct, the rule the lower courts articulated in the “Baby Doe” cases does not, on its own
terms, reach the coronavirus-inspired rationing of ventilators away from individuals with pre-existing
disabilities.
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Under the best reading of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Affordable
Care Act, the denial of life-saving treatments to individuals who have a distinct preexisting disability violates the law. In a true triage situation—one the coronavirus
pandemic may soon present—it may be necessary for the medical system to make
tragic choices about how to allocate scarce resources. But denying those treatments
to individuals because of their disabilities, when those individuals can benefit from
them, is not one of the choices the law permits.
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